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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a decision framework where people are individually
asked to either actively consent or dissent to some pro-social behavior. We hypothesize that
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contributes to the formation of issue-specific altruistic preferences while simultaneously
involving a commitment. The hypothesis is tested in a large-scale field experiment on blood
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willingness to donate blood, as well as the actual donation behavior of people who have not
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2One of the biggest challenges to institutional choice is the design and implementation of
decision-making mechanisms that promote pro-social behavior. Alfred Marshall noted in
1890 that “[n]o doubt men, even now, are capable of much more unselfish service than they
generally render: And the supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent social
asset can be developed most quickly, and turned to account most wisely.”
In this paper, we propose and empirically study a decision framework where people are
individually asked to either actively consent or dissent to some pro-social behavior. This is in
stark contrast to some noncommittal appeal to behave pro-socially that often addresses
everybody alike. Consider, for example, the issue of blood donation. With an active decision,
people are confronted with a request to donate blood to which they are expected to respond
with either a “yes” or a “no”. It is argued that an active decision induces people to deal with
some specific pro-social behavior and makes them aware of the social value of some
particular behavior. In doing so, active decisions contribute to the formation of issue specific
altruistic preferences while simultaneously involving a commitment. We thus understand
active decisions as an elicitation mechanism, as mentioned by Marshall, being capable of
transforming a latent willingness to donate, contribute or share in actual pro-social behavior.1
This is our basic hypothesis.
The functioning of active decisions builds on four behavioral regularities analyzed in research
on economics and psychology.
First, preferences are partly formed in the process of decision-making in unfamiliar choice
situations. A pertinent example is the creation of non-use values in contingent valuation
studies (Kahneman et al. 1999). In active decisions, people  are made aware of some
particular issue and are induced to engage in cognitive evaluations and reasoning (e.g. Cioffi
and Garner 1996). In blood and post-mortem organ donation, the deliberation involves
dealing with one’s own health, and people are motivated to get over the denial and repression
of their own mortality.
Second, people do not always act strictly and narrowly in a self-interested manner, but engage
in pro-social behavior like donating blood, volunteering, giving money to charities,
participating in democratic politics, or even putting their own health or life at risk to rescue
someone in peril.
                                                 
1 Active decision-making might also be relevant in overcoming self-control problems. Choi et al.
(2004) study the effect of active decisions on the likelihood of joining a pension savings plan.
3Third, the way situations of choice are presented influences people's decisions (framing
effects). In particular, there is a strong tendency to stick with the option that reflects the status
quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) or that which becomes effective if an individual does
not explicitly choose some alternative (so-called defaults; Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Active
decisions are a special form of framing/defaults: the options for deferring or repressing a
decision are removed from the individually perceived opportunity set.
Fourth, people aim to act consistently with regard to decisions made or positions chosen in the
past, i.e. commitments (Cialdini 2001). Commitments change people’s self-image and past
behavior provides information about one’s own preferences. This is partly due to processes of
self-signaling that support and reinforce people’s self-image (Bodner and Prelec 2003).
Commitments that active decisions bring about can thus entail consistent behavior in the
future, even though some initial "cheap" consent will involve high pecuniary or non-
pecuniary costs at a later point in time.
The behavioral consequences of confronting people with the decision to act pro-socially are
not uniform, but depend on the degree of stability of their altruistic preferences with regard to
some specific issue. The effect of active decisions on behavior, by its very nature, relies on
the endogenous formation of preferences through the process of decision-making. We thus
expect active decisions to be more effective when people are unaware of the importance of
some specific pro-social engagement, and when their latent motivation to donate or contribute
would otherwise remain dormant. We refer to this qualification as refined hypothesis. In
contrast, if people are well aware of some public good and have already made up their mind
about their contribution to it, preferences can be expected to be rather stable and little affected
by active decisions. If these same people are confronted with an active-decision mechanism,
they might actually perceive the intervention as controlling and even reduce their contribution
(see Frey 1997 for a general account of the crowding-out effect in contributions to public
goods).
We study the potential of active decisions for voluntary blood donation. The steady tightening
of access criteria for blood donors increases the risk of excess demand for blood. It is still
technically impossible to artificially reproduce blood compounds. If new donors are not
successfully recruited on a regular basis, blood shortages can become a central health care
4problem.2 Moreover, there is evidence that many latent donors never contemplated becoming
an active donor (Riedel et al. 2000). We thus hypothesize that an active decision framework
can successfully elicit blood donations.
Our study was incorporated in a Red Cross blood drive at the University of Zurich. In total,
more than 1,800 students participated. They neither knew that an experiment was taking place
nor that researchers from the economics department were involved. Professors granted us
permission to distribute a brief survey during the last ten minutes before the break in the
middle of their lectures, and to make a brief announcement regarding the blood drive. There
were three experimental conditions implemented: In the active decision treatment, the survey
contained a page at the end asking the subjects whether they were willing to donate blood at
one of the times mentioned on the information sheet. They had two possible choices: yes or
no. If they answered yes, they had to say when they would show up for the blood donation. In
the first control condition, the last page of the survey was nearly identical; we merely added a
third possible option – stating that they were undecided. In the second control condition, there
was no such page at the end of the survey. However, along with the survey, all students also
received an information sheet, listing dates and times in the week to come when they could
donate blood. To obtain a measure of the latency of pro-social preferences, we asked the
students in the survey whether they felt they were sufficiently informed about the importance
of donating blood.
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that active decisions play an important role in
uncovering latent pro-social preferences. We find that among students who indicated that they
were not sufficiently aware about the importance of donating blood, the active decision
treatment increased blood donations significantly relative to the two other conditions. The
difference is larger with regard to the second control group. Confronting this group of
subjects with explicit choice options thus increases participation. This also holds when we
condition on previous blood donations. Hence, the result is not due to mere experimentation
to find out what donating blood is like. In contrast, we even find a slightly negative effect
(albeit not statistically significant) for the active decision treatment on blood donation for the
group of students who stated that they are sufficiently aware about the importance of donating
                                                 
2 We emphasize voluntary blood donation because no accepted alternative social arrangement for
activating people to donate blood seems to exist. In particular, a majority rejects the installation of a
market, and markets of this type did not perform well in the past (for a discussion, see Titmuss 1972).
5blood. Overall, we interpret the results as evidence that active decisions can help develop
Marshall's latent social asset.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section I describes the experimental
design in detail. Section II provides descriptive statistics, and section III presents the results of
the experiment. Section IV offers concluding remarks.
I. Experimental Setup
We conducted our study in the context of a regular blood drive that the Swiss Red Cross
(SRC) arranges at the University of Zurich. In a normal year, the SRC simply posts
information material in classrooms with information on the hours and location of the blood
drive. In the winter semester 2004/2005, the Swiss Red Cross, in collaboration with us,
obtained permission to conduct a study in seven large undergraduate lectures at the University
of Zurich.
The study consisted of a brief survey, which contained demographics, questions aimed at
measuring pro-social preferences, and personality scales. The survey also contained several
questions regarding donating blood. Our key question capturing the awareness of the
importance of donating blood read "Do you feel sufficiently informed about the importance of
donating blood?" and had to be answered with a “yes” or a “no”. We consider answers to this
question to be proxy of whether an individual has made up her mind about donating blood,
one way or the other. The question avoids asking specifically about topic-related knowledge.
However, individuals answering "no" have arguably given less thought to the matter, without
implying a preference in either direction.
A. Treatments
There were three experimental conditions:
Treatment Group (TG): For the subjects in the treatment group, the last page of the survey
contained a sheet inviting them to donate blood. It listed the times and places of the blood
drive. Most importantly, the individuals were asked to either consent or dissent to
participating in the blood drive by ticking a "yes" or "no" box. If a subject chose to
participate, he or she was asked to commit to an actual date and time for the blood donation.
All subjects also received a separate information sheet, looking identical to the last page of
6the survey, except that it did not contain the question asking them to decide whether or not to
donate blood. In bold letters, it said "for you to take home" on that sheet.
Control Group 1 (CG1): The last sheet for this group was almost identical to that of the TG.
The only difference was that it contained an additional box, saying "I do not want to make a
decision" [about donating blood], i.e. no decision was required. Subjects in CG1 also received
the information sheet to take home.
Control Group 2 (CG2): The survey did not contain a page asking this group to make a
choice. Like everybody else, however, the subjects in CG2 received a sheet containing
identical pieces of information about the blood drive.
B. Procedures
In order to implement the treatments in a large population, we selected seven large lectures
and asked the professors to concede 10 minutes of their lectures before the break. A
representative of the SRC gave a brief informative presentation, while the assistants
distributed the survey. It can safely be assumed that the students were not aware that an
experiment was being conducted.
We decided how to distribute the different treatments in the lecture rooms based on their
layout plans. To ensure that students would not notice that an experiment was being
conducted, we used natural "barriers", such as aisles, to separate the sections in which
different treatments were distributed. The assignment of the treatments to the different
treatment sections was random. Depending on the layout of the lecture room, it was
sometimes not possible to conduct all three treatments. Therefore, treatments are randomized
within lectures, but not between them.
Special care was taken to ensure identical information conditions for all subjects. After the
students had worked on the survey for about 5 minutes, the assistants distributed the
additional information sheet that contained the same information (and the same invitation,
word by word) as the last page of the survey for the TG and CG1. This was to make sure that
all students not only had the same information regarding the times and places of the blood
drive, but also regarding the normative value of the campaign. We printed the extra sheet on
colored paper to ensure that the students would notice it. Furthermore, the times and places of
the blood drive were also mentioned during the SRC representative's presentation.
7II. Descriptive Statistics
Participation in the study was very high; the response rate was well above 95%.3 In total,
1,852 questionnaires were handed in. Four people were younger than 18 and thus not allowed
to donate blood. Another 10 people did not answer the question regarding awareness of the
importance of donating blood. It was possible to match all the blood donations to the
remaining 1,838 subjects.
Table 1 provides a first impression of the data. It shows the stated willingness to donate
blood, the fraction of individuals actually donating blood in the blood drive, and the answers
to the question regarding awareness of the importance of donating blood. 14% of the
respondents indicate a willingness to donate blood in the survey. This fraction is calculated
based on the stated preferences of the subjects in the TG and CG1. 7.6% of the sample
population actually donates blood. The table shows that donations differ considerably
between the different courses covered. First and second-year medical students express by far
the highest propensity to donate blood, followed by biology students.
There are also differences in answers to the awareness question between courses. While
almost 90% of the second-year medical students answer that they feel sufficiently informed
about the importance of donating blood, only slightly more than half of the students in the
journalism course say so.
As there are clear differences in the propensity to donate blood across subjects of study (as
documented in Table 1), and as we only randomized treatments within lectures, we purge the
data in Table 2 of any course specific effects. Specifically, we normalize the data by
subtracting the corresponding course average from each observation.
Table 2 presents this normalized data cut by treatment and by awareness. We first report
descriptive statistics for actual blood donation behavior. Adjusted mean effects are shown in
the upper half of Table 2. The effect of the active decision treatment on blood donations
depends strongly on whether the subjects feel aware of the importance of donating blood or
not. Subjects answering "no" to the awareness question show a clear increase in the tendency
to donate blood in the TG relative to CG1 and CG2. The last column of Table 2 calculates the
difference between the TG and CG2, and the associated standard error of the estimate. The
difference is large relative to the baseline propensity to donate blood: The fraction of donors
increases by 7.2 percentage points. The standard error for this difference is small, indicating a
8statistically significant treatment effect. On the other hand, subjects who respond with a “yes”
to the awareness question are not more likely to donate blood if assigned to the TG. If
“aware” people are explicitly asked to make a decision on whether or not to donate blood,
they are less likely to donate blood than in the other treatments. As the last column shows, the
fraction of donors is reduced by 2.9 percentage points in the TG relative to CG2.
The lower half of Table 2 shows the survey responses to the invitation to donate blood in the
TG and CG1. Irrespective of whether individuals feel aware of the importance of blood
donations, the additional option ("I do not want to make a decision.") in CG1 seems to reduce
the fraction of individuals saying they will donate blood. This finding reflects that for actual
donation behavior. The last column in Table 2 calculates the difference between the TG and
CG1 and the corresponding standard error. For both groups, regarding the stated willingness
to donate, the standard error is large relative to the size of the effect.
III. Results
A. Blood Donations
The data allows us to examine the effects of active decisions on actual blood donations, and
further on the stated willingness to donate blood expressed in the absence of costly
consequences, i.e. in a cheap talk situation. We estimate the impact of the experiment on
blood donations (and stated preferences) using a linear probability model with robust standard
errors (for a discussion see Moffitt 1999).
In Table 3, the dependent variable is equal to one if an individual donates blood and zero
otherwise. Thus, the coefficients of any variable in this regression can be directly interpreted
as the change in the fraction of individuals donating blood resulting from a one-unit increase
in the independent variable, holding the value of the other variables constant. We also present
the probit-model estimates in the appendix; qualitatively, they yield the same results.
The effect of the treatments on blood donations is reported in Table 3. We choose CG2, in
which subjects were not required to fill out a decision sheet, as the reference category. As
before, the treatment effect is reported separately for people who are not aware of the issue
and for those who are aware of the issue.
                                                                                                                                                         
3 Only a few people were observed leaving the lecture halls without handing in a questionnaire.
9We find that people without well-formed preferences (first column of Table 3) are
substantially more likely to donate blood if they are exposed to the active decision. We
estimate that the treatment leads to an 8.7 percentage-points increase in the probability of
donating blood relative to CG2. The effect is almost unchanged and still highly statistically
significant if a large set of additional control variables is taken into account (third column of
Table 3). Importantly, one of the control variables includes whether the individual has
donated blood before. Since the point estimate is virtually unaffected when past behavior is
included as a control, our effect does not seem to be due to mere subject experimentation to
find out what donating blood is like. The additional control variables are jointly statistically
significant predictors of blood donation behavior.
Individuals in CG1 are also slightly more likely to donate blood than individuals in CG2.
Contrary to our prediction, there is some evidence that already the exposure to choice can
mobilize pro-social behavior, independent of whether only a “yes” and a “no” option is
available, or whether an option for “no decision” is also offered. Ex post, this might also be
explained by the factual possibility of leaving the decision sheet blank, which was available to
all the individuals in the TG and CG1. However, the standard error of the estimated
coefficient for CG1 prevents us from drawing definite conclusions regarding CG1.
The experimental intervention matters much less for people who are aware of the issue and
who have supposedly already made up their mind about donating blood. For people in the TG,
we actually find a slightly lower probability (-2.4 percentage points) of donating blood –
although not statistically significant – than in CG2 (second column of Table 3). The finding is
very similar when we add more controls in the fourth column of Table 3.
In sum, the active-decision intervention does not generally increase the probability of
donating blood. Rather, and in line with the refined hypothesis, the treatment effect depends
on whether people already formed preferences about donating blood. If people who do not
feel sufficiently aware of the issue are approached, active decisions affect pro-social behavior
even when high immediate costs are involved.
B. Stated Preferences
Table 4 summarizes the results for people’s stated willingness to donate blood. The active
decision treatment effect is calculated relative to CG1, i.e. people who have a third choice
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option indicating “no decision”. CG2 is not included at this stage because no explicit decision
has to be made in the questionnaire by people in this group.
We find that the active decision treatment has a positive effect on the expressed willingness to
donate in accordance with the basic hypothesis. There is a substantial, but imprecisely
estimated, difference in the treatment effect between people who are not aware of the issue
and those who are aware of the issue (first and second column of Table 4). The probability of
stating a willingness to donate blood increases by 7.1 percentage points for people who are
not aware of the issue. In contrast, there is only an increase of 2.7 percentage points (not
statistically significant) for people who are aware of the issue. This difference in the treatment
effects between the two groups becomes more pronounced when a large set of additional
control variables from the survey is included (third and fourth column of Table 4).
In sum, we find that the implemented active decision framework has a significant effect on
stated preferences for individuals indicating relative unawareness of the topic and their own
contribution. In contrast, no significant effect is measured for those who are aware of the
issue. Thus, we do not observe the predicted general positive effect. However, the results
show the asymmetry in the treatment effect, depending on the formation of preferences as
formulated in the refined hypothesis.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We examine whether an active-decision framework affects perception and cognition
processes to the extent that pro-social behavior is evoked. People are asked in an active
decision to either consent or dissent to a request in an otherwise unrestrained choice situation,
i.e. subjects are de facto confronted with the same behavioral options as in a situation where
no active decision is involved. Behavioral consequences of active decisions arise if by asking
for an explicit statement, (i) cognitive processes are stimulated in which a more in-depth
examination of the request’s content takes place than in the case of not requesting an explicit
answer, and (ii) the expressed choice is understood as commitment.
The effect of active decision on pro-social behavior is studied in a large-scale field
experiment in blood donation. Almost 2,000 people were invited in a non-binding manner to
donate blood at a blood drive, which was taking place the week after the survey intervention.
In a newly designed questionnaire, people answered various topic and attitude-related
questions. Individuals assigned to the treatment group are explicitly asked at the end of the
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questionnaire whether they are willing to donate blood in the upcoming blood drive or not. In
the first control group, individuals have the additional option of ticking a box, which states
that they do not want to make a decision. In the second control group, no explicit request is
formulated in the questionnaire.
We find that, for people without well formed preferences on blood donation, an active
decision intervention increases their likelihood of donating blood despite the high immediate
opportunity costs. This supports the basic behavioral hypothesis. Rather than a smaller
positive effect, we find a small, although not statistically significant, negative effect for
people who report being aware of the blood donation issue. This latter finding indicates that
the elicitation of pro-social preferences is a subtle endeavor and that active decisions might
provoke unintended counter effects if they are perceived as controlling.
The active decision also affects people’s stated willingness to donate blood in case they have
no fully formed preferences about the issue. In the field of blood donation, the effect on the
preference statement is, of course, of less relevance. However, it indicates that an active
decision might be effective in other social areas, like post-mortem organ donation or
individual saving behavior where a statement with low immediate costs puts people on a
donor list or in a savings plan.
Our results differ from those in research on mere measurement effects (Morwitz et al. 1993)
where, for example, asking people whether they intend to buy “a car” is shown to increase
their probability of actually buying one. An active-decision intervention elicits pro-social
behavior oriented towards a specific activity. The results further indicate that whether or not
people act pro-socially is not given, but is rather context- and issue-specific.
Active decisions are potentially a procedural innovation to develop the “latent social asset” in
society. It is, however, important to learn when active decisions are perceived as supportive
(rather than controlling) and work to build up pro-social preferences. One question might be,
for example, how often an active decision framework can be applied when its effect varies
with subject awareness. However, one intervention might be enough to overcome the
stickiness of a low-contribution status quo for some issues like post-mortem organ donation.
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TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
!
Percent stating a
willingness to
donate blooda
Percent actually
donating bloodb
Percent aware of
importance of
donating bloodb
Number of
observationsb
Medical school (first year) 29.7% 24.0% 72.4% 246
Medical school (second year) 16.8% 11.0% 88.9% 171
Biology  (first year) 20.2% 8.9% 70.1% 157
Economics (first year) 8.6% 5.2% 64.4% 399
Economics (second year) 4.8% 2.0% 74.6% 354
Journalism (first year) 7.9% 3.9% 57.9% 178
Law (first year) 8.9% 3.9% 64.3% 333
Total 14.0% 7.6% 69.5% 1,838
Notes: a Calculations are based on subjects in the treatment group and control group 1 (N = 1302).
b Calculations are based on the full sample.
Source: Own calculations.
TABLE 2 – THE OUTCOMES OF THE EXPERIMENT
Fraction donating blood, course mean subtracted
Importance of
donating blood
Treatment
group
Control
group 1
Control
group 2
Difference
treatment group -
control group 2
Not aware 0.040 0.010 -0.032 0.072
N 249 134 177 (0.021)
Aware -0.015 0.001 0.013 -0.029
N 654 265 359 (0.015)
Fraction indicating willingness to donate, course mean subtracted
Importance of
donating blood
Treatment
group
Control
group 1
Control
group 2
Difference
treatment group -
control group 1
Not aware 0.055 -0.004 n/a 0.059
N 249 134 (0.036)
Aware -0.007 -0.030 n/a 0.023
N 654 265 (0.024)
! ! ! ! ! !
Notes: Standard error of estimates in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
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TABLE 3 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON ACTUAL BLOOD DONATION
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD
Dependent variable: donated blood (=1)
! ! ! ! !
OLS regressions OLS regressions
! ! ! !
Not aware Aware Not aware Aware
! ! ! ! !
Treatment group 0.087*** -0.024 0.085*** -0.025
(3.50) (-1.54) (3.38) (-1.54)
Control group 1 0.045 -0.006 0.035 -0.005
(1.48) (-0.26) (1.15) (-0.20)
Control group 2 reference category reference category
Age, sex included. included
Course included. included
Pro-social motivationb not included included
Life goalsc not included included
Personalityd not included included
Past Behaviore not included included
Behavior of relatives and
   friendsf
not included included
R2 0.117 0.067 0.184 0.088
N 496 1192 496 1192
! ! ! ! !
!
Notes: Robust z-values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six
dummy variables for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point
scales; c intrinsic and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality
characteristics each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-
point-scales); e indicates if and when an individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood
donation behavior of relatives and friends.
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test.
Source: Own calculations.
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TABLE 4 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON THE STATED WILLINGNESS TO DONATE BLOOD
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD
Dependent variable: willingness to donate blood (=1)
! ! ! ! !
OLS regressions OLS regressions
! ! ! !
Not aware Aware Not aware Aware
! ! ! ! !
Treatment group 0.071* 0.027 0.092** 0.031
(1.63) (0.99) (1.99) (1.37)
Control group 1 reference category reference category
Control group 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Age, sex included included
Course included included
Pro-social motivationb not included included
Life goalsc not included included
Personalityd not included included
Past behaviore not included included
Behavior of relatives
   and friendsf
not included included
R2 0.084 0.079 0.194 0.133
N 339 855 339 855
! ! ! ! !
!
Notes: Robust z-values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six
dummy variables for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point
scales; c intrinsic and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten
personality characteristics each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality
dimensions (7-point-scales); e indicates if and when an individual made a blood donation in
the past; f past blood donation behavior of relatives and friends.
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test.
Source: Own calculations.
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Appendix
TABLE A.1 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON ACTUAL BLOOD DONATION,
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD
Dependent variable: donated blood (=1)
! ! ! ! !
ML probit ML probit
! ! ! !
Not aware      Aware  Not aware        Aware
! ! ! ! !
Treatment group 11.56%*** -2.65% 7.72%*** -2.51%
(3.01) (-1.33) (2.92) (-1.34)
Control group 1 11.03%** -1.25% 6.94%** -1.21%
(2.14) (-0.56) (1.99) (-0.59)
Control group 2 reference category reference category
Age, sex included. included
Course included. included
Pro-social motivationb not included included
Life goalsc not included included
Personalityd not included included
Past behaviore not included included
Behavior of relatives and
   friendsf
not included Included
Mean predicted frequency 5.01% 5.70% 1.90% 4.98%
N 496 1192 496 1192
Log Likelihood -118.15 -285.23 -96.35 -273.18
! ! ! ! !
!
Notes: Main table entries are marginal effects for probit regressions, the corresponding z-values
are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six dummy variables for
courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point scales; c intrinsic and
extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality characteristics each
representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-point-scales); e indicates
if and when an individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood donation behavior of
relatives and friends.
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01
Source: Own calculations.
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TABLE A.2 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON THE STATED WILLINGNESS TO DONATE BLOOD,
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD
Dependent variable: willingness to donate blood (=1)
! ! ! ! !
ML probit ML probit
! ! ! !
Not aware Aware Not aware Aware
! ! ! ! !
Treatment group 6.88%* 2.86% 8.06%** 3.20%
(1.66) (1.16) (2.10) (1.37)
Control group 1 reference category reference category
Control group 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Age, sex included included
Course included included
Pro-social motivationb not included included
Life goalsc not included included
Personalityd not included included
Past behaviore not included included
Behavior of relatives and
   friendsf
not included included
Mean predicted frequency 14.70% 11.23% 11.88% 9.22%
N 339 855 339 855
Log Likelihood -140.07 -304.85 -124.43 -278.70
! ! ! ! !
!
Notes: Main table entries are marginal effects for probit regressions, the corresponding z-
values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six dummy variables
for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point scales; c intrinsic
and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality characteristics
each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-point-scales); e
indicates if and when an individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood donation
behavior of relatives and friends.
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01
Source: Own calculations.
